As founder of The Brancato Law Firm, P.A., a Tampa criminal defense firm, and a former police academy instructor who taught officers the law of stops and searches, I read Vasquez Perdomo as a case about the Fourth Amendment as much as immigration. Many Florida criminal cases now begin with an encounter involving an officer who also holds federal immigration authority. Our attorneys look at how every stop started, because a stop without reasonable suspicion can still lead to suppression of evidence in a Florida criminal case.

What Happened in Noem v. Vasquez Perdomo?

The case began as a challenge to immigration sweeps in the Los Angeles area in the summer of 2025. Pedro Vasquez Perdomo and other plaintiffs, along with immigrant rights groups, sued the Department of Homeland Security in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California (No. 2:25-cv-05605). They alleged that agents were stopping people at bus stops, car washes, tow yards, farms, and day-labor sites based on how they looked, what language they spoke, where they were, and what work they did.

On July 11, 2025, District Judge Maame Ewusi-Mensah Frimpong issued a temporary restraining order that barred stops based solely on four factors, alone or in combination:

1. Apparent race or ethnicity.
2. Speaking Spanish or speaking English with an accent.
3. Presence at a particular location, such as a bus stop, car wash, tow yard, day-labor pickup site, or agricultural site.
4. The type of work a person does.

The Ninth Circuit refused to stay that order on August 1, 2025. The government then asked the Supreme Court for emergency relief.

What Did the Supreme Court Decide?

The Supreme Court granted the government’s application and stayed the district court’s order. In Noem v. Vasquez Perdomo, 606 U.S. ___, 146 S. Ct. 1 (2025), the Court’s one-paragraph order stayed the July 11 order “pending the disposition of the appeal” in the Ninth Circuit and any timely petition for certiorari. The order did not explain the Court’s reasons, which is common for rulings on the emergency docket.

What Did Justice Kavanaugh’s Concurrence Say?

Justice Kavanaugh wrote that the four factors, taken together, can give agents reasonable suspicion of illegal presence in the Los Angeles area. He wrote: “To be clear, apparent ethnicity alone cannot furnish reasonable suspicion; under this Court’s case law regarding immigration stops, however, it can be a ‘relevant factor’ when considered along with other salient factors.” He relied on the high number of people in the Los Angeles region without legal status, which he put at “about 2 million illegal immigrants out of a total population of 20 million.”

He also described the stops as brief: “If the person is a U. S. citizen or otherwise lawfully in the United States, that individual will be free to go after the brief encounter.” And he concluded that the plaintiffs likely lacked standing to seek a broad, forward-looking injunction under Los Angeles v. Lyons, because they could not show they were likely to be stopped again. Commentators have since used the term “Kavanaugh stop” for a brief immigration stop justified by a combination of these factors.

What Did Justice Sotomayor’s Dissent Say?

Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson, argued that stops based on the four factors violate the Fourth Amendment because they are not individualized. Quoting earlier precedent, she wrote that a set of facts cannot be reasonable suspicion if it “describe[s] a very large category of presumably innocent” people. She warned that the ruling pushes citizens to carry proof of status to move freely, which she described as creating a second-class citizenship status for people who look or sound a certain way.

How Does Vasquez Perdomo Fit With Brignoni-Ponce?

Vasquez Perdomo builds on a 50-year-old case about roving Border Patrol stops. In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975), Border Patrol officers in southern California stopped a car only because its three occupants appeared to be of Mexican descent. The Supreme Court held that officers on roving patrol need “specific articulable facts” supporting reasonable suspicion, and that Mexican ancestry “standing alone” does not justify a stop, though it can be “a relevant factor.” Justice Kavanaugh cited that “relevant factor” language; Justice Sotomayor cited the same case for its holding that appearance alone is not enough.

Scholars warned about this tension long before 2025. In “How Racial Profiling in America Became the Law of the Land: United States v. Brignoni-Ponce and Whren v. United States and the Need for Truly Rebellious Lawyering,” 98 Geo. L.J. 1005 (2010), presented at a Georgetown Law Journal symposium, then-Dean Kevin R. Johnson of UC Davis School of Law examined how Brignoni-Ponce’s “relevant factor” language and Whren’s tolerance of pretext stops left room for race to shape enforcement decisions.

Has the Supreme Court Said Anything About Race-Based Stops Since?

Yes. Three months later, in Trump v. Illinois, 607 U.S. 1 (2025), a December 23, 2025 decision about the National Guard deployment in Illinois, Justice Kavanaugh wrote in a concurrence that the Fourth Amendment requires that immigration stops “be based on reasonable suspicion of illegal presence, stops must be brief, arrests must be based on probable cause, and officers must not employ excessive force.” He added: “Moreover, the officers must not make interior immigration stops or arrests based on race or ethnicity.”

Where Does the Vasquez Perdomo Case Stand in 2026?

The Supreme Court’s stay is still the last word on the July 2025 restraining order, and the lawsuit continues in the district court. According to the Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse docket summary, the Ninth Circuit sent the case back in October 2025 so the district court could dissolve the Fourth Amendment portion of the restraining order. In 2026, the district court largely denied the government’s motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint, and in June 2026 they moved for class certification and a new preliminary injunction against alleged warrantless arrests. As of the most recent docket update we reviewed, those motions had not been decided.

Does Vasquez Perdomo Apply in Florida?

The stay itself applies only to the Los Angeles order, but the reasoning reaches Florida because immigration enforcement here runs heavily through local police and sheriffs. Section 908.11, Florida Statutes, requires every sheriff or chief correctional officer operating a county jail to enter a written 287(g) agreement with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, which lets trained local officers perform certain immigration functions.

Participation goes well beyond county jails. A statewide snapshot posted by FDLE, the Immigration Agency Data Summary, which uses ICE and Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission data as of June 2026, shows that 272 of 394 Florida law enforcement agencies held a 287(g) Task Force Officer agreement, and that Florida had 9,026 credentialed designated immigration officers.

That means a stop in Tampa Bay may be made by an officer who can ask both criminal and immigration questions. Justice Kavanaugh’s later statement in Trump v. Illinois, that officers “must not make interior immigration stops or arrests based on race or ethnicity,” is a point our attorneys raise when the facts show appearance or language drove the stop.

Can Evidence From an Unlawful Immigration Stop Be Suppressed in Florida?

In a Florida criminal case, yes, evidence from a stop made without reasonable suspicion can be suppressed under the Fourth Amendment, no matter which agency made the stop. A traffic or street stop that leads to drugs, a weapon, or a no-valid-license charge rises or falls on what the officer knew before the stop. Our Tampa criminal traffic lawyer page covers the license charges that often follow these stops.

Immigration court is different. In INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984), the Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule generally does not apply in civil deportation proceedings, while leaving open “egregious violations of Fourth Amendment or other liberties.” So a suppression win in state court does not automatically end an immigration case, and a person facing both needs advice on each. Our firm handles the Florida criminal case and works with the client’s immigration counsel.

What Should You Do If You Are Stopped and Questioned About Immigration Status?

Stay calm, do not run or resist, and do not lie or show false documents. You can ask whether you are free to leave. You can decline to answer questions about where you were born or your immigration status and say you want to speak with a lawyer, though a driver must still produce a license, registration, and proof of insurance on request in Florida. Remember the officer’s name, agency, and badge number, and write down what happened as soon as you can.

If a family member is arrested in Hillsborough County, language matters from the first hearing. Under section 903.046, Florida Statutes, immigration status is one of the factors a judge considers in setting bail, and in the 13th Judicial Circuit, the Court Interpreter Center provides interpreters for first appearance, arraignment, and trial. Our guides to how a bond hearing works in Tampa and to our Spanish-speaking criminal defense team explain what families can expect. For another recent Fourth Amendment decision, see our post on Case v. Montana and police welfare checks.

Frequently Asked Questions About Noem v. Vasquez Perdomo

Did the Supreme Court rule that ICE can use race in immigration stops?

No, the Court issued an unexplained stay, and Justice Kavanaugh’s concurrence said apparent ethnicity alone cannot furnish reasonable suspicion, though it can be one factor among others. The Brancato Law Firm reads the stop reports in our clients’ Florida cases to see whether anything beyond appearance or language supported the stop.

Is Noem v. Vasquez Perdomo a final decision?

No, it is an emergency stay that keeps the July 2025 restraining order on hold while the case continues in the lower courts. Our attorneys at The Brancato Law Firm follow the litigation because a later ruling could change how courts view these stops.

What is a Kavanaugh stop?

A Kavanaugh stop is a commentator’s term for a brief immigration stop justified by a combination of factors such as location, type of work, language, and apparent ethnicity, based on Justice Kavanaugh’s concurrence. The Brancato Law Firm challenges the reasonable suspicion behind any stop that leads to a Florida criminal charge; see our criminal traffic defense page for license cases.

Do I have to answer an officer’s questions about my immigration status in Florida?

No, you generally have the right to remain silent and to ask for a lawyer, but you should not lie, run, or present false documents, and drivers must show a license on request. Our attorneys at The Brancato Law Firm, including Spanish-speaking staff, can explain these rights to your family in their own language.

Can a U.S. citizen be detained in an immigration stop?

Yes, the stops allowed by the stay can involve U.S. citizens, and Justice Kavanaugh wrote that a citizen “will be free to go after the brief encounter.” The Brancato Law Firm advises clients who were detained to write down the details right away, because those facts matter if a criminal charge follows.

Can a Florida criminal case be dismissed because of an illegal stop?

Often the remedy is suppression of the evidence, which can lead the State to drop the charge if the evidence was its whole case. Our attorneys at The Brancato Law Firm file motions to suppress in Hillsborough, Pinellas, and Pasco County courts when a stop lacked reasonable suspicion; our Tampa criminal defense team can review the report.

For how this fits into the rest of a case, see our stage-by-stage guide to the Florida criminal case process.

Talk to a Tampa Defense Attorney After a Stop

If a stop led to an arrest, the first decision is whether to challenge how the officer made it, and that review should happen before the arraignment. Call The Brancato Law Firm, P.A., founded by Tampa Criminal Defense Attorney Rocky Brancato, at (813) 727-7159. You can call us at any hour, and our office is two blocks from the courthouse. Our firm has Spanish-speaking staff, and attorney Jean-Luc Adrien speaks Spanish, Haitian Creole, and French, so families can talk with us directly about the criminal case and its immigration consequences.

For more about our defense strategies, visit our Tampa Criminal Traffic Lawyer page.

The Brancato Law Firm, P.A.
620 E. Twiggs Street, Suite 205, Tampa, FL 33602
(813) 727-7159
Serving Hillsborough, Pinellas, and Pasco Counties

The Brancato Law Firm, P.A. is a Tampa-based criminal defense practice. We are not affiliated with any other Brancato-named law firms.

I’m Rocky Brancato, founder of The Brancato Law Firm, P.A., a Tampa criminal defense firm. I taught search and seizure to police officers at the police academy — the same rules discussed on this page — and today our attorneys use that insider’s understanding of how stops and frisks are supposed to work to challenge the ones that don’t.

What Is Florida’s Stop and Frisk Law?

Florida’s Stop and Frisk Law, section 901.151, Florida Statutes, is the state’s codified version of the rule from Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) — the landmark U.S. Supreme Court case that first allowed officers to briefly detain and pat down a suspect on less than probable cause. The Florida statute authorizes an officer to temporarily detain any person “under circumstances which reasonably indicate that such person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit” a crime, for the limited purpose of identifying the person and learning the circumstances that aroused the officer’s suspicion.

The statute then draws boundaries that many street encounters blow straight through. The detention may last no longer than reasonably necessary to accomplish that limited purpose, and it may not extend beyond the place where it began or its immediate vicinity. If probable cause to arrest develops, the officer must arrest; if it does not, the officer must let the person go. Every one of those requirements is a potential defense issue, because the statute’s final subsection is a weapon our attorneys use regularly: no evidence seized in a search under the statute is admissible in any Florida court unless the stop and the search complied with the statute’s own rules.

What Does the State Need to Stop You? (Less Than You Think)

The legal standard for the stop itself is reasonable suspicion — specific, articulable facts suggesting criminal activity, judged by the totality of the circumstances. It is far less than probable cause, and far less than proof. But it must be more than a hunch, a feeling, or your mere presence in the “wrong” neighborhood.

Here is a quirk of the statute that surprises even lawyers: section 901.151 uses the words “probable cause” in its frisk provision, but Florida courts have held that in this statute the term actually means reasonable belief or suspicion — the point was repeated just weeks ago in State v. Lyles, No. 3D24-1602 (Fla. 3d DCA Aug. 5, 2026), a decision we discuss in detail below.

Florida courts judging reasonable suspicion look at the whole picture. In Cook v. State, No. 4D2025-1960 (Fla. 4th DCA Aug. 5, 2026), decided the same day as Lyles, the Fourth District repeated the factors courts weigh: the time; the day of the week; the location; the physical appearance of the suspect; the behavior of the suspect; the appearance and manner of operation of any vehicle involved; and anything incongruous or unusual in the situation as interpreted in light of the officer’s experience.

When Can Police Frisk You? The Stop Is Not Enough

A lawful stop does not automatically authorize a frisk — this is the single most misunderstood point in Florida stop-and-frisk law. Under section 901.151(5), the officer must separately have a reasonable belief that you are armed with a dangerous weapon and therefore pose a threat to the officer or someone else, and even then may search “only to the extent necessary to disclose, and for the purpose of disclosing,” the weapon.

Florida courts distill this into three conditions, each of which the State must satisfy: the detention itself must be lawful; the officer must have a reasonable suspicion that the person is armed; and the pat-down must be strictly limited to finding the weapon. The suspicion that you are armed must rest on some objective basis — courts point to things like aggressive behavior, furtive movements, or a visible bulge in the clothing — and not simply on whatever justified the stop in the first place. A frisk that fails any of the three conditions is unlawful, and what it turns up is subject to suppression under the statute’s exclusionary rule.

What Does the Lyles Decision Mean for Gun Cases?

In State v. Lyles, No. 3D24-1602 (Fla. 3d DCA Aug. 5, 2026), officers responding to a shots-fired report had a fairly detailed BOLO — a “be on the lookout” description — of the suspect. A detective spotted Lyles, who matched the description, and when they made eye contact the detective saw a bulge at Lyles’s waistband and watched him move his hand to adjust it. The detective stopped him and lifted his shirt, revealing a firearm. The trial court suppressed the gun, reasoning in part that the stop and the search happened simultaneously and that the detective never articulated safety concerns.

The Third District reversed. The court held that the totality of the circumstances — a BOLO for a shooting suspect, the matching description, the bulge, and the hand movement toward it — gave the detective reasonable suspicion that Lyles was armed and dangerous, and that nothing in the law forbids the stop and the protective search from happening at the same moment.

The evergreen lessons cut both ways, and our attorneys use each of them. For the State, Lyles confirms that a bulge plus a furtive adjustment, in the context of a shots-fired BOLO, will usually justify a frisk. For the defense, the decision reaffirms the framework that decides these cases: the frisk requires its own objective justification, distinct from the stop. When there is no bulge, no furtive movement, no report of a weapon — just an officer’s routine habit of patting down everyone he stops — the framework Lyles applied is the roadmap to suppression. In the permitless-carry era, when carrying a firearm is often perfectly legal, these stop-and-frisk boundaries have become the central battleground in Tampa Bay gun prosecutions — we cover the substantive gun charges in our guide to Florida’s gun crime laws.

Is Running From the Police a Crime in Florida?

It can be — and the answer traces to one of the most consequential Florida Supreme Court decisions of the modern era. In C.E.L. v. State, 24 So. 3d 1181 (Fla. 2009), a teenager standing in the common area of an apartment complex in a high-crime area took off running the moment officers approached, then kept running after they ordered him to stop. The Florida Supreme Court held that unprovoked, headlong flight from police in a high-crime area itself creates the reasonable suspicion that justifies a stop — and that once the officers’ command to stop was therefore lawful, the continued flight in defiance of it constituted the crime of resisting an officer without violence under section 843.02, Florida Statutes.

The rule has hard edges worth knowing. Mere presence in a high-crime area is not reasonable suspicion, and as a general rule flight alone, without more, does not support a resisting charge — it is the combination of unprovoked flight plus the high-crime setting that changes the analysis. Whether the area actually qualifies as “high-crime,” whether the flight was truly unprovoked, and whether the officer’s command came before or after the legal justification arose are all litigable questions, and they decide real cases. We break down the resisting charge itself in our guide to resisting an officer without violence in Florida.

What Are Your Rights During a Stop and Frisk?

You have more rights during a street stop than most people exercise — and fewer than internet folklore suggests. You are not required to answer questions beyond basic identification during a lawful stop, and you never have to consent to a search: a frisk imposed over your objection must stand on the officer’s own reasonable suspicion that you are armed, or its fruits are suppressible. What you cannot lawfully do is physically resist, run from a lawful command to stop, or give a false name — each of those converts a bad stop into a real charge.

The most valuable thing you can do during a questionable stop is preserve the record rather than win the argument. Note the time and place, what the officer said, what you were doing, and who saw it. The legality of the stop will be decided later, in a courtroom, on a motion to suppress — not on the sidewalk. And because section 901.151(6) makes compliance with the statute a condition of admissibility, the details you remember often become the suppression motion our attorneys file.

How Do We Challenge an Unlawful Stop or Frisk?

We attack the stop and the frisk as separate events, because the law treats them separately. First, the stop: what specific facts did the officer possess before the detention began? Reasonable suspicion is measured only by what the officer knew at that moment — facts learned afterward cannot rescue a bad stop. Second, the frisk: what objective basis suggested you were armed — and if the honest answer is “nothing beyond the stop itself,” the three-condition framework applied in Lyles points toward suppression. Third, the scope: a pat-down that wanders beyond a search for weapons into pockets, bags, or containers has left its legal authority behind.

I taught officers exactly where these lines sit, and our attorneys read every report and every second of body-worn camera footage against that training. In Lyles itself, the body camera showed no visible bulge — the case turned on what the detective testified he saw. Those disputes are where suppression motions are won and lost, and they are why the earliest weeks of a case, while video and witnesses are still available, matter most.

What Should You Do If a Stop and Frisk Led to Charges?

Say nothing about what was found — not whose it is, not why it was there — because possession cases are built on statements far more often than on fingerprints. Then get the stop reviewed quickly. Body-worn camera footage, surveillance video from nearby businesses, dispatch and BOLO records, and CAD logs establishing exactly what the officer knew and when are the raw material of a suppression motion, and they are freshest — and sometimes only preserved — in the first weeks after an arrest. Under the statute’s exclusionary rule, a stop or frisk that violated section 901.151 means the evidence it produced cannot be used against you, and in a possession case that is usually the whole prosecution.

Frequently Asked Questions About Stop and Frisk in Florida

Can police stop me for no reason in Florida?

No. An investigatory detention requires reasonable suspicion — specific facts reasonably indicating you have committed, are committing, or are about to commit a crime, under section 901.151, Florida Statutes. Officers may always attempt a consensual encounter and ask questions, but unless the encounter ripens into a lawful stop, you are free to decline and walk away. Our attorneys review body camera and dispatch records in every case to pin down which kind of encounter it really was.

Do I have to answer police questions during a stop?

Beyond identifying yourself during a lawful stop, you are not required to answer investigative questions, and declining to answer is not a crime. Anything you volunteer, however, can supply the probable cause that turns a detention into an arrest. The safer course is polite silence and an early call to a defense lawyer.

Can police search my pockets during a frisk?

Not as a general search. Section 901.151(5) limits the frisk to what is necessary to find a dangerous weapon — an outer-clothing pat-down, extended only as needed to disclose the weapon. A frisk that becomes a hunt through your pockets for drugs or other evidence exceeds the statute, and what it finds is subject to suppression under section 901.151(6).

Is it illegal to run from the police in Florida?

It can be. Under C.E.L. v. State, 24 So. 3d 1181 (Fla. 2009), unprovoked flight from officers in a high-crime area creates reasonable suspicion for a stop, and continuing to flee after a lawful command to stop is resisting an officer without violence — a first-degree misdemeanor. Whether the area was truly “high-crime” and whether the command was lawful are contested questions our attorneys litigate.

I was carrying my gun legally — can police still frisk me?

The sight of a firearm is no longer automatic evidence of a crime in Florida’s permitless-carry era, which is precisely why the frisk rules matter more than ever. The officer still needs reasonable suspicion of criminal activity for the stop and a reasonable belief you pose a danger for the frisk. If a lawful carry led to charges anyway, The Brancato Law Firm, P.A. examines both the stop and the charging decision — start with our guide to Florida’s gun crime laws.

Can evidence from an illegal stop and frisk be thrown out?

Yes — Florida’s Stop and Frisk Law contains its own exclusionary rule. Section 901.151(6) makes evidence from a search inadmissible unless both the detention and the search complied with the statute. The Brancato Law Firm, P.A. builds suppression motions on exactly that provision; call (813) 727-7159 for a free review of how your stop actually happened.

For more about our defense strategies, visit our Hillsborough County Criminal Defense Attorney page.

Related reading: What Are the Gun Crime Laws in Florida? · What Is Resisting an Officer Without Violence in Florida? · Florida’s Second DCA Limits the “Plain Smell” Cannabis Search Doctrine · What to Do After Being Arrested in Tampa, Florida

For how this fits into the rest of a case, see our step-by-step guide to what happens in a Florida criminal case.

The Stop Decided Your Case Before You Ever Saw a Courtroom

If a street stop, a pat-down, or a “routine” detention in Hillsborough, Pinellas, or Pasco County produced the evidence against you, the lawfulness of those first ninety seconds may decide everything that follows. Call the attorneys of The Brancato Law Firm, P.A. — founded by Tampa Criminal Defense Attorney Rocky Brancato, who taught these rules at the police academy — at (813) 727-7159 before the body camera footage and dispatch records that can prove your stop was unlawful disappear into routine retention purges.

The Brancato Law Firm, P.A.
620 E. Twiggs Street, Suite 205, Tampa, FL 33602
(813) 727-7159
Serving Hillsborough, Pinellas, and Pasco Counties

The Brancato Law Firm, P.A. is a Tampa-based criminal defense practice. We are not affiliated with any other Brancato-named law firms.